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Abstract—The functionality that distributed ledger technology
provides, i.e., an immutable and fraud-resistant registry with
validation and verification mechanisms, has traditionally been
implemented with a trusted third party. Due to the distributed
nature of ledger technology, there is a strong recent trend towards
using ledgers to implement novel decentralized applications for a
wide range of use cases, e.g., in the financial sector and sharing
economy. While there can be several arguments for the use of
a ledger, the key question is whether it can fully replace any
single trusted party in the system as otherwise a (potentially
simpler) solution can be built around the trusted party. In this
paper, we introduce an abstract view on ledger use cases and
present two fundamental criteria that must be met for any use
case to be implemented using a ledger-based approach without
having to rely on any particular party in the system. Moreover,
we evaluate several ledger use cases that have recently received
considerable attention according to these criteria, revealing that
often participants need to trust each other despite using a
distributed ledger. Consequently, the potential of using a ledger
as a replacement for a trusted party is limited for these use cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is tremendous interest in the blockchain, the dis-
tributed ledger that powers and secures the Bitcoin network.
A plethora of applications and use cases for ledger technology
have been suggested recently, ranging from registry services to
smart contracts. This interest is due to the desirable properties
of distributed ledgers: Transactions are executed exactly once
and an immutable record of all transactions is maintained in a
fault-tolerant and tamper-proof manner. Moreover, if the ledger
is publicly available, as is the case for the Bitcoin ledger,
anybody can verify the correctness of its records.
Traditionally, such features are offered through a trusted
third party, which hosts multiple databases for the sake of
availability and fault tolerance and vouches for the integrity
of the stored data. The main disadvantage of having a third
party is that trust is required in this party not to abuse its power
and to faithfully provide its services. What is more, there is a
risk that an attacker gains control over the third party, which
enables the attacker to compromise the third party’s services
and invalidate its guarantees, e.g., the attacker could delete or
modify records.
The main difference between using a third party and a ledger
basically lies in the claim that the ledger removes the need
to trust any particular party. In other words, trust is shifted
from a specific party to a distributed system and its embedded
protocols [10]. As a consequence, one needs Xto trust that
the majority of the parties involved in maintaining the ledger
follows the protocols, ensuring that the ledger operations
are carried out as intended, and the remaining (malicious)
entities cannot corrupt the system. Since trust is a valuable
and crucial commodity in any distributed system, it comes
as no surprise that numerous use cases for ledger technology,
other than virtual currencies, have been proposed and are being
investigated.
Most proposed applications utilizing ledger technologies
can be classified into three categories of growing complexity:3
1) Registry service: Storing digital records in an immutable
and auditable distributed ledger.
2) Asset exchange: Asset creation and ownership transfer.
3) Execute smart contracts: Automate business processes
through the execution of code.
The information stored in the ledger can represent physical or
digital assets, identities, transactions, or contracts. A protocol
governs how entries are created, validated, recorded, and
distributed.
For applications belonging to the first category, the ledger
records important facts and events such as births, marriages,
deaths, property deeds, intellectual property, election results,
legal decisions, financial investments, insurance policies, or
medical history. For such registry services, the main appeal is
that records stored in the ledger are immutable and that they
can potentially be used across organizational boundaries (with
data protection and privacy mechanisms in place). Especially
the latter is viewed as an important prerequisite for digital-
ization in the financial and medical industries as well as for
governmental services.
Banks are particularly interested in the exchange of (digital)
assets, facilitating cross-border payments and more transparent
stocks, derivatives, and options trading. Furthermore, trans-
actions changing the ownership of or providing access to
physical goods can be carried out on a ledger.
One step beyond transactions are so-called smart contracts,
a (typically) distributed protocol that executes the terms of
a contract autonomously with the aim of reducing the risk of
error and manipulation. It has been proposed to add support for
smart contracts on top of a ledger: The contract is stored in the
ledger in the form of executable code. When a smart contract is
executed, the ledger network members run the executable code
according to the terms agreed upon in the contract. Since each
execution starts with the same initial state, this automatic and
distributed execution ensures consensus on the result among all
members that execute the contract correctly.1 Smart contracts
offer the potential for new financial instruments, parameterized
insurance contracts, and other services combining a shared
database with the means for verifiable calculations or auto-
mated approval processes between two or more participants
without trusted third parties.
While use cases are often described in terms of their poten-
tial compared to the state of the art, e.g., outlining potential
cost savings, there is little discussion on how well the ledger
actually fits the given use case. A noteworthy exception is the
study by Wu¨st et al. [20], which introduces a methodology
to determine if and what type of blockchain technology is
appropriate for a set of relevant use cases.
Contributions. In this paper, we focus on the specific
question whether a ledger can be used to transfer trust from
key parties to a distributed system. To this end, we provide a
model that is generic enough to capture a large set of use cases
that have been proposed in practice and introduce criteria that
any use case must necessarily meet in order to replace a trusted
third party with a ledger-based solution. Furthermore, we
discuss instantiations of our model for various use cases that
have been implemented or proposed in recent years, showing
that the criteria are not satisfied for most of them. This result
implies that ledger-based technology may offer limited benefits
for many currently proposed use cases. It is worth noting that
we do not address the question if and how incentives can lead
the involved parties to act correctly and how a party can verify
if a ledger implementation can be trusted. These challenges are
out of the scope of this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Distributed Ledgers. The original blockchain as used in
the virtual currency Bitcoin is a distributed ledger for the seri-
alization of transactions [11]. The ledger mechanisms provide
a replicated linked list of immutable blocks, maintained by a
large number of nodes, which tolerate malicious behavior of a
small group of nodes and still reach consensus on the blocks
of the ledger with a proof-of-work protocol.
Using the ledger, virtual currency can be transferred from
senders to receivers in a fully distributed manner, cutting out
any middle man or trusted third party. This feature has gained
enormous visibility and is envisioned to transform the financial
sector and potentially bring disruptive innovation to many
other sectors that traditionally rely on trusted third parties as
1If the code involves non-deterministic operations, shared coins [2] can be
used to guarantee that all parties maintain the same state.
well.2,3,4 Among the ledger technology applications discussed
in the past are supply chain provenance [8], [12], intellectual
property rights management [14], proof of existence [6],
micro-payment systems [21], to name but a few. Most of
them rely on the immutability of the stored records and the
fact that any party can verify if some properties or conditions
hold. These applications are often built on top of systems that
use other consensus protocols [15], such as proof-of-stake or
classic Byzantine fault tolerance protocols [18].
More recently, the notion of smart contracts [16] has gained
traction, with implementations in prominent projects such
as Ethereum [3] and Hyperledger [4]. Smart contracts are
programs that are executed in the ledger environment and their
correct execution is enforced by a consensus protocol. The
rules of the contracts are encoded in a programming language
and determine under which conditions transactions or other
operations are executed. For example, a contract can guarantee
that virtual currency is only transferred once a certain event
has happened, which has many applications, e.g., in insurance
and escrow systems. If one of the parties breaches a contract
or aborts a transaction, the ledger can ensure that the other
involved parties obtain a compensation.
Smart contracts are stored in the ledger and can be invoked
by sending transactions to the contract’s address. Once this
transaction is added to the ledger, all blockchain nodes
execute the contract code with the current state of the ledger
and the transaction payload as input and agree on its output
using the ledger’s consensus protocol.
Trusted Third Parties. Trust is based on the implicit or
explicit assumptions that participants behave ”as they should”,
i.e., that they follow a protocol as it was intended. The
concrete assumptions on the abilities and behavior of (po-
tentially malicious) participants varies from use case to use
case and it is crucial to make these assumptions as clear as
possible to choose the right technology and protocols. Hence,
trust represents the flip-side of adversarial capabilities. For
many interactions between participants, a trusted third party
can expedite processes and ensure that malicious behavior is
mitigated. In general, a trusted third party can execute arbi-
trary functions based on inputs provided by the participants.
Mainelli and Smith [10] describe three core functions a trusted
third party must offer for ledger applications.
• Recording:Holding the record of transactions in the event
of dispute.
• Transacting: Preventing duplicate transactions, e.g., in
order to prevent any party from selling the same thing
twice (“double spending”).
2https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-highlights-insurance-blockchain-
industrializing-trust, last accessed on April 9, 2018.
3http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21677198-technology-behind-
bitcoin-could-transform-how-economy-works-trust-machine, last accessed on
April 9, 2018.
4https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/focus/tech-trends/2017/blockchain-
trust-economy.html, last accessed on April 9, 2018.
• Validating: Confirming the existence of tradeable goods
and membership of the trading community.
The first function can be implemented using standard database
or distributed ledger technology. The second function requires
additional mechanisms to linearize the transactions and verify
the correctness of the linearization. The implementation of
the third function must be adapted for each specific use case
and can be hard to implement. We will extend the definition
of the third function in this paper and describe criteria to
decide if ledger technology can provide validation for object
existence, properties, conditions, and records.
Reputation Systems. Distributed ledgers are not the only
technology where trust is crucial. Trust is involved whenever
two or more parties exchange virtual or physical goods. A
multitude of trust and reputation systems have been devised
for various (web-based) applications, see [7] for a survey. The
authors describe different trust classes as well as categories
for reputation and trust semantics that can be used in trust
and reputation systems. Furthermore, they discuss centralized
and distributed reputation system architectures and methods to
compute reputation scores.
Theodorakopoulos and Baras [17] investigate trust formed
in interaction networks without a central trusted party, under
the assumption that trust grows with each interaction where
the participants have been following the protocol correctly.
Recently, Carboni [5], and Schaub et al. [13] presented ap-
proaches for reputation systems built on top of ledger technol-
ogy. The former provides a reputation system using reputation
vouchers that all participants involved in an exchange sign and
that can be used to produce feedback on the trustworthiness of
participants. The latter focuses on a privacy-preserving system
applying blind signatures and a proof-of-stake ledger.
It is important to note that all these reputation systems
are based on the assumption that past behavior together with
incentives to build further trustworthiness predicts how reliable
a participant is, i.e., they cannot provide guarantees for future
behavior. As a consequence, they may help to increase the
trust in systems, but they cannot fully solve trust issues.
III. MODEL
As mentioned before, there is significant interest in using
distributed ledgers for a large range of use cases other than
providing the underpinning for virtual currencies. However,
while the key characteristics closely match the requirements
of recording global monetary transactions in an immutable
ledger in an environment with open membership and no trust
in any single entity in the system, applying distributed ledgers
to other use cases is not straightforward. In order to understand
the limiting factors for a ledger-based solution with respect to
trust, we must formally introduce a few concepts.
A. Distributed Ledger
A distributed ledger Λ represents a verifiable sequence of
records, Sk = (r1, . . . , rk). The ledger is distributed in the
sense that it is replicated across several machines operated by
different entities in order to achieve fault-tolerance and protect
against malicious actions. It uses protocols, hashes, and digital
signatures for validation, maintenance, authenticity, privacy,
and access rights.5 In order to ensure the correct execution of
protocols, they are also replicated and executed in a distributed
manner where every correct entity transitions to the same
(correct) state. Since the correct entities share the same state,
they agree on the same sequence of records Sk = (r1, . . . , rk).
A set of participants (sometimes called users) may propose
new records, while another (not necessarily disjoint) set of
participants validates them, and adds them to the ledger
following the aforementioned protocols. We call participants
in the second set maintainers, which are called validators,
endorsers, orderers, or miners in different ledger approaches.
There are mechanisms in place that make it hard to change
any information recorded in Λ or at least make it easy to detect
changes (audit trail). As a consequence, we assume the entries
in Λ to be immutable with high probability, i.e., the probability
that recorded items can be modified or removed from Λ is neg-
ligible. Thus, Λ can provide the recording function of a trusted
third party. As an example, the proof-of-work mechanism in
Bitcoin ensures that successfully modifying blocks without
disrupting the chain of hashes is highly improbable (unless
an exorbitant amount of computational work is invested).
Hence the ledger protocols describe how records are created,
validated, stored in the ledger, and distributed to all involved
parties. More precisely, it defines a system of rules that allow
the involved parties to exchange messages with agreed syntax
and semantics. In particular, we assume the ledger protocols
guarantee the following properties for maintainers proposing
records to be appended to the ledger. For simplicity, we let
the index of the records r1, . . . , rk represent the logical time
at which they were added to the ledger.
Definition 1 (Ledger Consensus). A ledger consensus protocol
has the following properties:
P1 Agreement: For a given c ∈ N, if a correct maintainer
holds a sequence of records Sk = (r1, . . . , rk), then for every
correct maintainer that holds a sequence Sj = (r
′
1
, . . . , r′j)
we have that ri = r
′
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,min(j, k − c)}
for all k ∈ N with high probability. We say that the correct
maintainers decided on these records.
P2 Validity: A record rk decided by a correct maintainer must
have been proposed by a participant.
P3 Termination: For all k ∈ N, each correct maintainer
eventually decides on a record rk.
The formal definition of consensus for distributed ledgers
deviates from the classic consensus definition: Agreement is
defined over a sequence and prefixes thereof. The motivation
is that Λ is considered an immutable list of records, and there
5Protocols offering privacy and access control for distributed ledgers
exist [9], [22] and may be required for some use cases. This does not affect
the criteria we define.
may only be temporary inconsistencies with respect to the last
few (c ≥ 1) records. Decision is defined over the records that
do not change anymore with high probability.
As we do not impose any restrictions on how agreement
is reached, it is important to note that our model applies
to both so-called permissioned ledgers, where membership
is governed by some potentially distributed authority (e.g.,
Hyperledger [4]), and permissionless ledgers (such as the
Bitcoin blockchain), where anybody can become a miner and
propose blocks.
As mentioned in the previous section, it is also possible
to dynamically add smart contracts to Λ. As smart contracts
encode instructions that are not part of the basic ledger
functionality, the functionality of any particular smart contract
may only be relevant for a subset of all participants.
B. Use Case
A use case U comprises the involved parties, the records
that the parties create, and the objects involved in these
records. Let P , O, and R denote the set of (possible) parties,
objects and records, respectively, in the considered use case U .
Objects represent the basic elements considered in the use
case. Records connect a logical time stamp (index), objects,
and parties and are stored by a trusted third party or in a
distributed ledger. Formally, a record rk ∈ R with index k can
be modeled as a tuple (k, P ′ ⊆ P,O′ ⊆ O, s) where s is a
string describing the interaction of the parties and the objects.
In general terms, the objective of a use case is achieved when
a set of predicates over the records evaluates to true. The exact
nature of the predicates depends on the use case.
We illustrate the meaning of the above definitions with a
real-world example: The most well-known use case of ledger-
based technology is virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin. In
Bitcoin, the bitcoins correspond to the objects, the parties
represent the users and miners, and records are the transactions
transferring bitcoins among the parties. An example of a pred-
icate in this use case states that bitcoins are only transferred
from user A to user B if user A initiates this transaction.
Recall that we focus on the implementation of a validation
service through a distributed ledger as a replacement of a
trusted third party. The specific properties and conditions to be
verified depend on the use case, its objects, and the interactions
of its parties. Any object is characterized by its properties and
functions. Note that the properties and functions of an object
can be bound to certain parties, e.g., the current owner of an
object can be saved as a reference to a party. As the sequence
of records represent the state of the ”world“ of the use case,
we can define predicates over single records and the whole
sequence of records, which can be evaluated to true or false.
The purpose of a validation service can be defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Validation Service). A predicate C over the set
of records is a function mapping each record to a Boolean
value, C : R → {true, false}. Analogously, predicates
can be defined over the sequence Sk of the first k records,
Ck : Sk → {true, false}. A validation service evaluates
such predicates and provides the corresponding information
to interested parties.
The validation service can be used to verify if a predicate
is satisfied by a single record or sequence of records. The
predicates and their evaluation depend on the use case and the
parties must agree on them. Note that the set of predicates
that define the use case goals are typically a superset of the
predicates that are validated by the validation service.
In practice, a validation services is used to confirm the
existence of an object and that all records involving this object
conform with this object’s properties and functions.
In the easiest case, this service is provided by a trusted
third party that stores all records and performs all validation
and verification actions. As an example, a validation service
for monetary transactions validates each transaction, checking
that not more money is spent than the sender possesses.
When replacing the trusted third party with a distributed
ledger Λ, its fixed protocols and the distributed nature of
Λ entail that no trust is required that any particular entity
adheres to the rules of the protocol. Rather, it is assumed that
a majority of the parties execute the protocols correctly. Thus,
a ledger can store records in a tamper-proof manner. Moreover,
the protocol can also facilitate validation by ensuring that all
participants agree on the result of the corresponding proce-
dures. This functionality can often be implemented through
smart contracts, which in turn can create more records to be
added subsequently.
Note that a distributed ledger must meet the ledger con-
sensus properties given in Definition 1 in order to implement
a validation service. The agreement condition must hold as
validation relies on the consistent information in the distributed
ledger, i.e., all correct maintainers must decide on the same
records. Moreover, there must be some progress eventually
(termination property P3) and only information proposed by
participants must be entered (validity property P2). Further-
more, if the agreement property P1 only holds probabilistically
for a ledger implementation, then the use case goal must be
expressed in terms of this probability.
There are different ledger implementations for Definitions 1
and 2. In this paper we do not study how they are achieved
and whether the incentive system of the ledger is appropriate
for a given use case. Rather, we analyze conditions that must
be met in addition to the ledger consensus properties in order
to fully replace a trusted third party for any use case requiring
a validation service.
IV. CRITERIA
For the model defined above, we describe two general
criteria that any use case must meet to provide a validation
service through a distributed ledger without any trusted third
party. If any of the two (or both) criteria are not met, a ledger-
based solution may only offer limited benefits and it is likely
that other more efficient or more practical solutions exist.
A. Object Creation Criterion
1) Definition: Each party p ∈ P is allowed to create
records, and any existing object can be involved in the created
records without restrictions. A fundamental question is where
these objects come from. There are two cases that are ”safe“
in the sense that no trust issues arise. In the simplest case, the
set O of objects is predetermined, i.e., each record r ∈ R can
only involve objects from a fixed set. The second case is the
creation of new objects where the validation service confirms
their existence. For example, new objects can be added to
the sequence of records as a consequence of the predicate
evaluation of a prefix of the sequence. Hence, an agreed-upon
predicate decides on the existence of an object in this case.
In order to implement the validation service using a dis-
tributed ledger in the second case, the protocols must ensure
that the creation of objects is validated with an existence or
creation predicate according to the properties described in
Definition 1, i.e., the protocol underlying the system (and
the ledger) is executed in a distributed manner to agree on
new objects. A creation process is called consensus-based if
it satisfies these properties.
These cases are summarized in the following definition.
Definition 3 (Object Creation Criterion). Any use case U
meets the object creation criterion if and only if for all o ∈ O
it holds that o has been defined at t = 0 or object creation is
consensus-based.
In order to understand the significance of this criterion,
consider the case when the object creation criterion is violated.
If the set O is neither fixed nor determined by the underlying
consensus protocol according to predicate evaluation, then
parties can create records involving new objects individually.
This power bears the potential to cause problems.
If the ledger keeps track of object ownership (which is the
case for Bitcoin), malicious parties may try to anticipate the
creation of specific objects and enter records involving them
prematurely into the ledger to falsely claim ownership. This
attack is particularly troublesome when the identifier of future
objects can be guessed based on the existing objects. The iden-
tifier may simply be a function of the objects characteristics
potentially extended with a (predictable) serial number.
A possible scheme to protect against such premature object
creation attacks is to ensure that there is enough randomness in
the object identifiers to ensure that no future object (identifier)
can be anticipated with overwhelming probability. However,
even such a scheme can fall short of protecting the object
creation process: Assume that multiple parties are involved
in the creation of a new object, e.g., multiple employees in a
company working on an instance of a product. Any party with
knowledge about new objects and identifiers can prematurely
add them to the ledger before the rightful owner has the chance
to enter it. If P is not restricted, the malicious insider can claim
ownership for a newly created product under an arbitrary new
identity, which may make it hard for the rightful owner to
identify the culprit.
There is a simple solution to this problem: Restrict the
object creation to specific parties. For example, an object
referring to a specific product can only be entered by the party
corresponding to the company that is known to produce this
product. While this solution appears simple, it has a major
downside. The parties must trust specific parties to behave
correctly. Returning to the example of the company selling
certain products, a party must trust the party representing the
company that, e.g., the objects it creates indeed correspond to
(physical or digital) product instances. This is problematic as
a key requirement for ledger-based systems is typically that
no single entity must be trusted as mentioned earlier. Having
to suddenly trust some party may invalidate the approach to
use ledger-based technology in the first place because there are
often much simpler solutions when trust is not an issue. Simply
put, if we trust a party, it can simply maintain a database with
all its records and report them upon request, without the need
of a global and distributed ledger. The added benefit for the
company is that it can further control access to its data, which
is significantly harder to achieve when taking part in a global
distributed system.
Instead of a specific set of trusted parties, it is possible
to use a quorum-based approach to create new objects in
permissioned ledgers. Quorum and voting based approaches
are generally harder to implement in permissionless ledgers
due to the fact that a malicious user can create an arbitrarily
large number of (bogus) parties voting according to this user’s
interest. In either case, the object creation criterion can be met
if the participants agree on the predicate evaluation because
the protocol controls the decision.
Thus, if we do not want to trust specific parties and object
creation must be controlled, the system must meet the object
creation criterion. This observation is captured more formally
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Any use case U where a distributed ledger
can replace a trusted third party meets the object creation
criterion.
Proof. If the object creation criterion is not met, objects
are not pre-defined and the creation is not consensus-based.
This entails that some party can create some objects with-
out the agreement of other parties, violating property P1 of
Definition 1. Consequently, the creation of objects is not
validated through some pre-defined predicate in the system
as in Definition 2 and thus another mechanism is needed to
validate them. If there is no trust in this validation mechanism,
then there is no trust in the created objects, therefore trust
in this mechanism is needed. Since this mechanism must be
executed by some party, or a set of parties, trust in this party
is required, i.e., an additional trusted (third) party, potentially
comprising multiple entities, is needed.
B. Internal Predicate Criterion
1) Definition: The second criterion is concerned with the
fact that the stored records serve to indicate that some events
(e.g., transactions) happened and certain conditions must hold.
The purpose of the validation service in a ledger-based system
is to use the stored records to evaluate some predicates over
these records. The exact nature of the predicates depends on
the use case. Using again the example of a virtual currency,
a predicate may determine if a specific party holds a certain
amount of currency, which is a prerequisite for a monetary
transaction. If the truth value of a predicate C can always be
derived by examining only the current records stored in the
ledger, we say that C is an internal predicate. Any predicate
that is not internal, regardless of whether the predicate can be
verified at all, is called external.
Given these definitions, we are now in the position to state
the definition of the internal predicate criterion.
Definition 4 (Internal Predicate Criterion). Any use case
U meets the internal predicate criterion if and only if all
predicates of U are internal.
An example of an internal predicate in the context of virtual
currencies is C(ri) = true for any record ri transferring
funds from party p to p′ if and only if the funds have indeed
been transferred. For this example, the predicate C is trivially
true as virtual currencies only exist as part of transactions
and therefore the recording of a transaction is tantamount to
transferring the currency. Consequently, since only the current
sequence of records must be examined to evaluate C, it is an
internal predicate.
An example of a use case and associated predicate that
does not meet the internal predicate criterion is the following.
Assume that the ledger records cargo movement. The predicate
for a particular record indicates whether a specific container
has been shipped to a certain location. This predicate is
external as the ledger cannot prove the position of a container
in the physical world.
It is important to note that the internal predicate criterion
is not necessarily violated whenever the predicate refers to
objects and their state in the physical world. In fact, it is
possible to have predicates referring to physical objects that
are internal, and there are also purely “digital predicates” that
are external. As an example of the former, consider a system
with a ledger that states ownership for any plot of land. For
this clearly fictitious example, we assume that this ledger is
globally recognized as the binding authority on this matter.
Thus, if there is a transaction of selling a plot recorded in
the ledger, the buyer will immediately be the rightful owner,
i.e., the predicate is internal because the ledger alone is the
authority on some aspect of the real world. As an example
for the latter, consider the classic example of selling a website
through a smart contract. The contract states that the website
changes its owner once the new owner has transferred a prede-
termined amount to the current owner. However, the ownership
only truly changes once the registrar updates the corresponding
ownership record, i.e., it is an external predicate. The internal
predicate criterion in this example could be met by getting
rid of the registrar and, as in the preceding example, use the
ledger as the binding authority. In this situation, the rightful
owner (according to the ledger) can set up the website on any
server and announce the website from this server publicly.
Consequently, consistency between the ledger and external
accounts must be guaranteed for external predicates, which
requires trust in the consistency mechanisms.
Given that the use of a distributed ledger is typically
bound to specific requirements, particularly, no trust in any
single entity, the internal predicate criterion has fundamental
implications: If a predicate is evaluated externally, its value
must be provided by some party or parties, which may result in
multiple undesirable situations. First, the party or parties may
not be part of P , i.e., a completely different system has a direct
impact on the considered system. Problems in this situation
can be that the other system changes unilaterally, which
requires supervision and adaptation, or that the other system
ceases to cooperate with the considered system or terminates
its services altogether. Second, the considered system may
depend on a single party, e.g., a specific organization or
company. Thus, trust is again required in this party to report
the correct predicate value, which is, as stated before, often not
desirable. As for the object creation criterion, violation of the
internal predicate criterion is a strong indicator that a ledger-
based solution may not be the right approach to implement a
specific use case—and other options must be examined closely.
As for the object criterion, we can also state the significance
of the internal predicate criterion more formally in the form
of a simple theorem.
Theorem 2. Any use case U where a distributed ledger can
replace a trusted third party meets the internal predicate
criterion.
Proof. If the internal predicate criterion is not met, then
there is at least one predicate C that is not internal, i.e., it
may not always possible to determine its truth value based
on the records in the ledger alone. Consequently, there is
some object property external to the distributed ledger that
is required to evaluate C. In this case, a trusted party external
to the distributed ledger system is needed to provide the
missing information truthfully, otherwise the predicate cannot
be evaluated.
V. USE CASE EVALUATION
In this section, we investigate whether the criteria defined
above are met for a selection of proposed use cases. Note that
we do not intend to provide an exhaustive list of use cases
but show how to apply the criteria to prominent use cases that
have been proposed or implemented in recent years.
A. Virtual Currency
The prototypical use case of distributed ledgers is to enable
a virtual currency such as Bitcoin. In this use case, all virtual
currency is either “pre-mined”, i.e., exists from the very
beginning, or is created in each block that is mined, and
transferred using transactions recorded in the ledger. Recall
that in this use case the parties are the currency holders, the
objects are the “coins”, and the records are the transactions.
The object creation criterion is met in this case because
either no new coins are ever created or new coins are created
directly by the miners executing the ledger protocol, i.e., it
is consensus-based. As mentioned above, the quintessential
predicate for virtual currencies asks whether some funds have
been transferred in a transaction. We found that the internal
predicate criteria is also met as it is internal, i.e., the ledger
itself acts as the only valid source of information regarding
ownership of funds. Since there is no additional goal in this
use case and both criteria are met, a distributed ledger can
be used to replace a trusted third party as is evident from the
success of Bitcoin.
B. Notary Service for Ownership and Provenance
A proposed use case for ledger-based technology is to
provide a service to notarize ownership of physical objects or
intellectual property. There are multiple emerging companies
offering provenance platforms for a variety of goods. One
example is tracking the ownership of diamonds: The idea
is that diamonds can be uniquely identified using more than
40 features, which can be used to create unique identifiers.
Insurance companies add records of diamonds into their ledger
to immutably record ownership. Such a notary service is
interesting for insurance companies because it can help them
recoup costs after paying out an owner when a diamond has
been stolen or lost since the diamond belongs to the insurance
company if it re-emerges. Moreover, this ledger should deter
thieves from offering goods on online retail marketplaces as
the ledger can identify the offered goods as stolen.
The participants of this use case are the insurance and
mining/production companies and their clients, the objects are
the diamonds or other luxury goods and the records represent
proofs of ownership or provenance.
This use case does not meet the object creation criterion
when parties can add new objects without a consensus-based
protocol. This problem is addressed in that only insurance
companies can create new objects. Since trust in the insurance
companies is required anyway, entrusting the object creation
process to the insurance companies is not a major concern.
A feature to enable customers to create their own records is
planned, which will violate the object creation criterion.
A specific problem for the diamond use case is that the
argument of an economic disincentive for fraudsters to change
the characteristics of a diamond is wrong: It is true that any
physical change to the diamond results in a loss of value
but a stolen diamond has no value at all if it cannot be
sold. Therefore, there is an incentive to change the defining
characteristics and register it as a new diamond. Adding a
diamond to the ledger may require a proof of provenance,
which may be hard to obtain for a fraudster. Thus, trust in
mining companies to correctly certify provenance is required.
Several crucial predicates, e.g., asking whether an object has
been lost or stolen, cannot be verified based on the distributed
ledger. As discussed above, uniqueness cannot be determined
either in the sense that the same object can be registered
again with different characteristics. It follows that the internal
predicate criterion is not met either. Given that both criteria
are not met, it is essentially a system based on trust in certain
parties, e.g., the insurance and mining companies, there is no
clear incentive to use a ledger-based solution for this use case.
Thus, a (distributed) database shared among the key parties can
implement exactly the same functionality.
C. Inter-Bank Payments
There is substantial interest in ledger-based technology in
the financial industry as it is thought to simplify numerous
complex processes inside banks and also among banks. We
will focus on the impact that a ledger might have on inter-bank
payments. Nowadays, money passes through several banks
(each step incurring a certain fee) in a typical money transfer.
The complexity of this process entails that a transaction
often takes one or more days to process. An obvious idea
is to replace these complex mechanisms with a ledger-based
approach, which would have the potential to significantly
reduce transaction times, offer fault tolerance, traceability of
transactions, and simpler reconciliation of accounts.
In this use case, the participants are banks and their clients.
The objects are monetary units of a certain currency, and the
records represent the transferring of money between accounts.
Unlike the Bitcoin example, the object creation criterion is
not met in this use case as the creation of money of non-virtual
currencies is not consensus-based. Thus, trust in governments
and banks is still required to handle the creation of money as it
is done today. Naturally, this violation is not just acceptable but
desirable for the banks since it ensures that they will remain
an important party in the financial system. Regarding the
crucial predicate asking whether funds have been transferred,
the internal predicate criterion can be met if the content of
the distributed ledger is considered to be (legally) binding.
In this case, the accounts in all banks must be updated in
accordance with the distributed ledger and any discrepancy
must be identified and appropriate corrective actions taken to
conform to the transaction history stored in the ledger.
Thus, ledger technology can be used to implement inter-
bank payment systems but trust in the banks and governments
is still required. While it is technically feasible to use a ledger
for this purpose, there are other challenges that must be over-
come, in particular compliance with regulatory requirements
and standards and the implementation of strong governance
and data controls.
D. Insurance Fraud
In the near future, insurance customers will be able to take
pictures of broken goods and insurance claims forms with their
phones and have them processed by a ledger registry [19].
This registry can be used by insurers to prevent customers
from claiming payouts from multiple insurers. In the past,
this could easily take weeks to investigate. A ledger registry
could reduce the process of identifying duplicate claims to a
matter of seconds. More precisely, such a system could work
as follows: customers make insurance claims through their
insurer, where each claim record is time-stamped and signed
by the system. The system inspects the ledger for duplicate
claims. When combined with smart contracts, the claim can
be settled immediately if the claim is deemed valid.
The participants in this use case are insurance companies
and their customers. The objects are the insured goods and
the records represent the claims. Note that in this use case the
insurance companies have to trust each other and customers
have to trust the insurers. However, the insurers do want to
place trust in the customers.
For the object creation criterion we need to distinguish be-
tween the insurance of specific objects and generic collections
of objects (e.g., for renters/homeowners insurance or home
contents insurance). In the second case, the only objects are
contracts and claims for which the object creation criterion is
met due to protocols. However, the first case does not meet
the object creation criterion because the creation of objects for
the insured goods suffers from the same issues as the notary
service use case.
A much more important problem in this use case is the
internal predicate criterion. The system must be able to
evaluate the predicate asking whether a certain object is
damaged or broken, which is not possible without a physical
inspection. Pictures and videos do not provide sufficient proof
and could be used by two different customers for claims of
two instances of an object even though only one of them is
broken. Moreover, a picture does not correspond to ownership
and fraudulent claims could be made.
In summary, this ledger-based system cannot prevent insur-
ance fraud in this case. In addition to the trust among insurance
companies and from customers to the insurance companies, the
existence of a trusted third party that verifies the existence
and ownership of goods when establishing contracts and
mechanisms to validate the claims is required.
E. Microgrid Energy Trading
In this use case, energy is traded using the ledger [1].
Producers can offer a certain amount of energy that they
produce, e.g., using solar panels, and a (smart) contract is
settled with energy consumers.
The participants are the energy providers, distributors and
consumers, an object corresponds to a certain amount of
energy and the records track the amount of energy produced,
transmitted, and consumed as measured by smart meters.
The object creation criterion is not met because, in this
scenario, trust in the smart meters reporting the energy produc-
tion and consumption is required. A hacked firmware of one
or multiple smart meters can report higher or lower values,
which means the system is based on trusting the reported
values. For the same reason the predicate asking whether a
certain amount of energy has been produced cannot be verified
using the distributed ledger itself: The layout of the power
grid can be maliciously modified such that two smart meters
are installed sequentially instead of in parallel, which would
double the reported production. Therefore, an inspection of
the physical conditions is required, which means the system
is based on trusting a party and its inspection report. As a
result, the internal predicate criterion is not met.
While energy trading appears to be an interesting use case
for a ledger for the purpose of automating payments based on
reported energy values, it does not replace third parties and
trust in the overall system.
F. Supply Chain Management
An often discussed use case is to employ a ledger to
verify supply chains [12], [8]. In this scenario, it is assumed
that all suppliers use the ledger for material tracking and
verification of certain attributes during each step of production
and transportation.
Hence, the participants are the involved parties on the supply
chain, the objects are the materials and goods produced, and
the records represent the exchange of assets or modifications
of assets and their properties.
It depends on the process implemented for adding goods
into the ledger whether the object creation criterion is met:
If it is consensus-based leading to an agreement among the
involved parties, it can be satisfied, otherwise it requires trust.
The internal predicate criterion is more problematic. First,
the link to the material must be verified and it must be
ensured that the object referred to in the ledger exists, i.e.,
the predicate “does the object exist?” must be evaluated.
Furthermore, a supplier needs to state certain properties of an
object, each property corresponding to a predicate, and enter
this information into the ledger. However, these properties
must be (physically) verified, and the entity that verifies this
information must be trusted, which means the predicate is
external. Even when electronic devices are used to verify
properties, these devices are susceptible to hacks and mod-
ifications and therefore must be trusted. In summary, supply
chain verification requires trust in specific parties even when
using a distributed ledger.
G. Location Tracking
Another proposed use case is to track containers on a ship
using a distributed ledger.6 In this scenario, the ledger is used
to track all relevant information regarding a ship’s cargo in
an integrity-preserving manner. It is claimed that the ledger
will allow the carrier to improve its processes by eliminating
paperwork. Furthermore, smart contracts could be setup to
automatically trigger payments after the cargo has arrived at
its destination.
6https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603791/the-worlds-largest-shipping-
company-trials-blockchain-to-track-cargo/, accessed on April 9, 2018.
The participants in this use case are the companies respon-
sible for shipping and the owners of the cargo. The objects
are the containers and the records represent the location of
the objects at a certain point in time.
As for supply chain management, it depends on the proper-
ties of the object creation process whether the object creation
criterion is satisfied. The first issue with respect to the internal
predicate criterion is that it must be possible to verify that
a container object inserted into the ledger corresponds to a
real physical container. There must be trust in the entity that
verifies this information as the ledger itself cannot perform
this validation. Moreover, the internal predicate criterion is
also not addressed later in this scenario: Neither the ledger
nor a standard electronic document management approach
solves the problem that an authenticated link between the
physical container content with the electronic record must be
established, which implies that the predicate asking whether a
cargo load contains a specific object is external. Thus, there
must be a third party verifying that the initial cargo load
complies with the record. If the container might be opened
during transport, e.g., for inspection, a second problem arises,
which is to prove that nothing has been added, removed, or
altered during this inspection. Finally, the entity reporting that
the container has arrived at the destination must be trusted as
GPS signals can be forged. Thus, we can conclude that trust
towards some entities is crucial and cannot be removed by a
ledger-based approach.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While the distributed and consensus-based nature of ledgers
ensures immutability of records and fault tolerance without
requiring trust among the participants, how these properties
extend to trust in ledger use cases in a generic and formal
manner has not been studied.
We have presented two fundamental criteria to answer the
question whether a use case can be implemented without
trusting any specific party using a ledger-based approach. In
particular the criteria help to identify under which conditions
trust can be technically guaranteed by ledger-based approaches
and where additional, potentially non-technical mechanisms,
such as legal frameworks are necessary. Our criteria reveal
that using a ledger does not solve the trust issue for many
use cases implemented or proposed in recent years. Moreover,
the criteria bring to light that the ledger only becomes truly
powerful when it is recognized as the supreme authority in that
its consensus protocol controls the object creation process and
the predicate verification process is internal.
Regarding the internal predicate criterion, it is sometimes
technically possible to turn an external predicate into an
internal predicate. E.g., web domain registrars could be fully
replaced by a ledger-based system in the future. For some
use cases the organizational hurdles might be too high to
overcome, e.g., due to conflicting legal frameworks. It is
important to note that in some use cases it is impossible
to replace trust by a ledger: it will always be necessary to
involve another party for the verification of certain predicates.
In general, predicates depending on measurements of a sensor
will remain external because the sensor is a physical object
that cannot be represented entirely in a digital system.
As a consequence, while ledger technology bears potential
for new applications, many use cases will still require a trusted
third party.
REFERENCES
[1] N. Z. Aitzhan and D. Svetinovic. Security and Privacy in Decentralized
Energy Trading through Multi-signatures, Blockchain and Anonymous
Messaging Streams. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, 2016.
[2] M. Bellare, J. A. Garay, and T. Rabin. Distributed Pseudo-Random Bit
Generators—A New Way to Speed-Up Shared Coin Tossing. In Proc.
15th Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pages
191–200, 1996.
[3] V. Buterin et al. A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized
Application Platform. Ethereum White Paper, 2014.
[4] C. Cachin. Architecture of the Hyperledger Blockchain Fabric. In
Workshop on Distributed Cryptocurrencies and Consensus Ledgers
(DCCL), 2016.
[5] D. Carboni. Feedback Based Reputation on Top of the Bitcoin
Blockchain. arXiv preprint 1502.01504, 2015.
[6] M. Crosby, P. Pattanayak, S. Verma, and V. Kalyanaraman. Blockchain
Technology: Beyond Bitcoin. Applied Innovation, 2, 2016.
[7] A. Jøsang, R. Ismail, and C. Boyd. A Survey of Trust and Reputation
Systems for Online Service Provision. Decision Support Systems, 43(2),
2007.
[8] H. M. Kim and M. Laskowski. Towards an Ontology-Driven Blockchain
Design for Supply Chain Provenance. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.02922,
2016.
[9] A. Kosba, A. Miller, E. Shi, Z. Wen, and C. Papamanthou. Hawk:
The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving Smart
Contracts. In Proc. 37th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S&P), 2016.
[10] M. Mainelli, M. Smith, et al. Sharing Ledgers for Sharing Economies:
An Exploration of Mutual Distributed Ledgers (a.k.a. Blockchain Tech-
nology). The Journal of Financial Perspectives, 3(3), 2015.
[11] S. Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. 2008.
[12] M. Pilkington. Blockchain Technology: Principles and Applications.
Research Handbook on Digital Transformations, page 225, 2016.
[13] A. Schaub, R. Bazin, O. Hasan, and L. Brunie. A Trustless Privacy-
Preserving Reputation System. In Proc. IFIP International Information
Security and Privacy Conference (IFIP SEC), 2016.
[14] M. Swan. Blockchain: Blueprint for a New Economy. O’Reilly Media,
Inc., 2015.
[15] T. Swanson. Consensus-as-a-Service: A Brief Report on the Emergence
of Permissioned, Distributed Ledger Systems. Report, available online
http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf ,
Apr, 2015.
[16] N. Szabo. Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks.
First Monday, 2(9), 1997.
[17] G. Theodorakopoulos and J. S. Baras. Trust Evaluation in Ad-Hoc
Networks. In Proc. 3rd Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe), 2004.
[18] M. Vukolic´. The Quest for Scalable Blockchain Fabric: Proof-of-Work
vs. BFT Replication. In International Workshop on Open Problems in
Network Security, pages 112–125, 2015.
[19] D. Weinland. Using Blockchain to Catch Insurance Fraud. Financial
Times Fintech Briefing, 2017.
[20] K. Wu¨st and A. Gervais. Do you need a Blockchain? IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 2017:375, 2017.
[21] A. Xu, M. Li, X. Huang, N. Xue, J. Zhang, and Q. Sheng. A Blockchain
Based Micro Payment System for Smart Devices. Signature, 256(4936),
2016.
[22] G. Zyskind, O. Nathan, and A. Pentland. Decentralizing Privacy: Using
Blockchain to Protect Personal Data. In IEEE Security and Privacy
Workshops (SPW), pages 180–184, 2015.
